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ABSTRACT 
       Historians often criticize Patrick J. Hurley for the failure of his diplomatic mission to 
China in 1944-1945. Instead of acting as an impartial mediator during the negotiations 
between the Guomindang (GMD) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hurley aligned U.S. 
policy with the GMD’s leader, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), who would come to lose the 
civil war against the Chinese Communists. Hurley’s unique position to create foreign policy 
resulted in the implementation of what became the established long-term policy in China. 
This policy eventually alienated the CCP and lead to the severing of diplomatic relations 
between the U.S. and China for decades.  
       Although historians have long since blamed Hurley’s personality and lack of 
understanding for the mission’s failure, no one has studied the role cultural influences had in 
shaping his attitudes and decisions. Hurley’s perception of China’s key actors and his own 
American colleagues, along with his subsequent behaviors, grew out of his life experiences, 
especially his cultural understandings of gender and class. Working-class men in the United 
States from the early-nineteenth to the early-twentieth century often fostered an aggressive 
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model of manhood that opposed the Victorian values of the middle and upper classes. Instead 
of valuing restraint and respectability, social norms which governed behavior in modern 
business offices and in respectable middle-class family life, these men valued the display of 
passion and physical assertiveness. Hurley was largely influenced by this form of 
masculinity, which has been labeled “primitive manhood.”  
       Constructions of gender and class can also be interconnected. Different socioeconomic 
classes often embrace varying ideals of proper gender roles. Hurley’s working-class origins 
and values would clash with the middle and upper-class backgrounds of the various State 
Department Foreign Service officers who counseled compromise with the CCP. His 
assimilation of these cultural constructs negatively affected his relationships with these 
diplomats and the CCP, resulting in his expulsion of all China experts who disagreed with his 
policy. No one was left to voice alternative viewpoints to Hurley’s successor, George 
Marshall, who ultimately continued Hurley’s misguided policy of upholding Jiang’s regime. 
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Introduction 
       On February 28, 1945, the stakes were high for Foreign Service officers John Service, 
George Atcheson, Arthur Ringwalt, and Fulton Freeman. The group knew they could lose 
their jobs, but they also recognized they could no longer remain silent. Not with so much on 
the line. For months, the ambassador in China, General Patrick J. Hurley, had been feeding 
President Roosevelt and the State Department inaccurate information regarding China’s 
internal political chaos and its deteriorating efforts to stave off Japan’s ongoing military 
conquest. From the perspective of the Foreign Service’s “China hands,” the headstrong 
Hurley consistently acted out of passion and impulse rather than reason. He tyrannically 
silenced opposing viewpoints and failed to comprehend the damage he was inflicting on 
American foreign policy. But on this day, the “fool” was away in Washington. At long last, 
the Foreign Service officers could send their distress signal. 
       Between 1927 and 1937, China’s Nationalist government, which was controlled by the 
Guomindang (GMD) political party, had been engaged in a civil war with the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). Following the Japanese military’s march across the Marco Polo 
bridge from Manchuria into China in 1937, both sides formed a temporary alliance 
designated the “Second United Front” to resist the hated invader. This front proved to be 
little more than a façade, as clashes between GMD and CCP forces continued on a frequent 
basis. By 1944, the Chinese military situation appeared grim and GMD-CCP unity remained 
elusive. To make matters worse, the GMD leader, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), had 
become embroiled in a bitter dispute with the American commander of the China-Burma-
India Theater, General Joseph Stilwell. For U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, China’s defeat 
could mean a prolonged Pacific War.  
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       In an attempt to resolve the conflict between Stilwell and Jiang, Roosevelt ordered 
General Hurley to China in September 1944 to mediate between them. Within a month, 
however, Jiang demanded Stilwell be recalled and replaced, leaving Hurley without a 
directive. Hurley used the opportunity to pursue negotiations between the GMD and CCP, 
attempting to persuade them to unite their military forces and form a coalition government. 
Obstinate and temperamental, Hurley would prove to be unfit to act as diplomat and 
implementer of American foreign policy. He oversimplified complex problems, had a limited 
understanding of China’s intricate cultural and political history, and made decisions based on 
inaccurate assumptions. 
       The longer Hurley’s diplomatic mission continued, the more insulated and aggressive he 
became. He more than earned the many nicknames given him by Chinese leaders and his 
own American staff: Colonel Blimp, Big Wind, Paper Tiger, Little Whiskers, the Clown, and 
the Albatross.1 Hurley inaccurately reported to Roosevelt and the State Department that 
negotiations were proceeding well, when in actuality, they were going nowhere. In fact, on 
February 19, 1945, reports surfaced that fighting had broken out yet again between GMD and 
CCP forces.2 Hurley’s only concrete accomplishment had been to more fully commit the 
prestige of the United States government to Jiang’s regime, a dubious achievement given the 
GMD’s lackluster military performance. Thus, while Hurley was away in Washington, the 
Foreign Service officers at the American embassy in Chongqing (the Nationalist 
government’s wartime capital) decided to intervene. 
                                                          
1 Russell D. Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), 
191-92; Michael Burleigh, Small War, Faraway Places: Global Insurrection and the Making of the Modern 
World, 1945-1965 (New York: Penguin Group, 2013), 103; and Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, 
Thunder Out of China (New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1946), 246. 
2 Lynne Joiner, Honorable Survivor: Mao’s China, McCarthy’s American, and the Persecution of John S. 
Service (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 120. 
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       Although John Service drafted the February 28 memorandum, all of the embassy’s 
political section officers agreed to take joint responsibility for its composition. A declaration 
at the bottom of the memorandum read, “This telegram has been drafted with the assistance 
and agreement of all the political officers of the staff of this embassy…”3 Indeed, George 
Atcheson had authorized the cable’s transmission to the State Department.4 They could no 
longer turn back. This memorandum titled, “The Situation in China,” drew conclusions that 
were antithetical to Hurley’s, namely that the United States consider providing the 
Communists with military assistance and pressure both the GMD and CCP to cooperate 
militarily and politically. After sending the memorandum, Service wrote his mother, “We 
may become heroes – or we may be hung.”5 
       When Hurley learned of the telegram in Washington, he characteristically exploded. 
With fire in his eyes, he yelled, “I know who drafted that telegram: Service. I’ll get that 
S.O.B. if it’s the last thing I do.”6 Hurley soon had his revenge. He demanded Service and 
Atcheson be recalled, while Ringwalt and Freeman requested transfers. During an interview, 
Ringwalt explained, “Mr. Hurley was not very nice to us, and my tour of duty was up, and, 
so, [Fulton] Freeman -- one of our bright boys -- and I managed to get ourselves sent back to 
Washington.”7 This would not be the last time these men fell victim to Hurley’s wrath. After 
his mission’s failure, Hurley charged that these men were Communist sympathizers who had 
                                                          
3 John S. Service, Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service, ed. Joseph W. 
Esherick (New York: Random House Inc., 1974), 358, 363. 
4 Ibid., 358. 
5 John S. Service, “Letters to Grace Service, March 8, 1945,” John Service Papers, Bancroft Library, quoted in 
Lynne Joiner, Honorable Survivor: Mao’s China, McCarthy’s America, and the Persecution of John S. Service 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 121. 
6 E. J. Kahn, The China Hands: America’s Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York: Viking 
Press, 1975), 153; John Service to Arthur Ringwalt, April 20, 1950, Subject File, John Stewart Service and 
Charles Edward Rhetts Papers, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum; and Service, Lost Chance in China, 358. 
7 Arthur R. Ringwalt, interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, June 5, 1974, 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/ringwalt.htm., 16. 
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intentionally sabotaged the mission. These allegations led to their investigation prior to and 
during the era of McCarthyism.8 
       Diplomatic historians have long since blamed Hurley’s personality, poor decision-
making, and lack of understanding for the mission’s failure. No one, however, has studied the 
role cultural influences such as gender and class had in shaping his attitudes and behaviors.9 
This study of Hurley, undertaken through the lens of culture, joins a growing body of 
scholarly literature that since the 1990s has shown how cultural constructions and cultural 
interactions have played a vital role in the making and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. 
Rather than ascribing Hurley’s ham-handed negotiating efforts in China primarily to 
individual personality quirks, though the quirks abounded, it examines how Hurley’s 
perception of China’s key actors and his own American colleagues, along with his 
subsequent behaviors, grew out the General’s life experiences, especially his cultural 
understandings of gender and class. This is a case study of how cultural factors can produce 
unexpected and undesirable policy outcomes.  
       This thesis examines Hurley primarily through the cultural lens of gender and how 
cultural constructions of masculinity shaped his attitudes and behaviors. Gender studies 
scholars in recent years have come to view gender as a fluid cultural construction or social 
norm that changes depending on time and place. From the early-nineteenth to the early-
twentieth century, working-class men in the United States often fostered an aggressive model 
of manhood that opposed the Victorian values of the middle and upper classes. Instead of 
                                                          
8 Barbara W. Tuchman, “If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives,” Foreign Affairs 51, no. 1 
(October 1972): 59. 
9 Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1971), 159-61, 166; and Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth 
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 103-05, 107-08, 113-14. 
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valuing restraint and respectability, social norms which governed behavior in modern 
business offices and in respectable, middle-class family life, these men valued the display of 
passion and physical assertiveness.10 By the late-nineteenth century, this form of masculinity, 
which Gail Bederman has labeled “primitive manhood,” gradually gained greater currency 
among middle-class men. Historian Amy Greenberg explained how the nation’s rapid 
industrialization and urbanization generated societal fears that men were becoming 
excessively civilized, de-masculinized, and for a lack of a better word, soft. “Middle-class 
men,” she writes, were accordingly “encouraged to embrace their animal nature, to improve 
their physical strength, and to develop their martial virtues.” Their “nostalgia for the 
sacrifices of the Civil War generation also supported the contention that middle-class 
men…needed to reanimate their essential masculine virtues.”11 Indeed, historian Kristin 
Hoganson argued that the crisis in American manhood intensified in light of the gathering 
momentum of the Women’s Suffrage Movement and contributed to the nation’s march to 
war against Spain in 1898.12 
       A son of Choctaw Indian Nation Territory in Oklahoma, Patrick J. Hurley imbibed many 
of these rough and ready attributes. According to E. Anthony Rotundo, these martial virtues 
of “primitive manhood” included “contempt of softness, surrender of private interest, 
obedience to command…courage, strength, endurance, duty principled sacrifice.”13 Although 
many of these traits are not necessarily undesirable, this study aims to demonstrate that some 
                                                          
10 Gail Bederman, Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-
1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 17; and E. A. Rotundo, American Manhood: 
Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern Era (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 227. 
11 Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire (New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 9. 
12 Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American 
and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). 
13 Rotundo, American Manhood, 233-34. 
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aspects of “primitive manhood,” specifically those which encourage an aggressive and 
vengeful temperament, shaped Hurley’s worldview and proved detrimental to his delicate 
diplomatic mission in wartime China. 
       Constructions of gender and class are often interconnected. Different socioeconomic 
classes embrace different ideals of proper gender roles. Hurley’s working-class origins and 
values would clash with the middle and upper-class backgrounds of the various State 
Department Foreign Service officers. Hurley perceived them as elitist while they perceived 
him as simple-minded and crass. Hurley’s class identification can also be complex, and 
frankly, a bit of a mystery at times. As he ambitiously climbed the social ladder from poverty 
to extravagant wealth, he latched onto rich and powerful people, such as Herbert Hoover, 
Henry Stimson, Harry Sinclair, Douglas MacArthur, and Franklin Roosevelt.14 Hurley 
simultaneously embraced his working-class roots while fighting desperately to escape them, 
never noticing the dichotomy.  
A Review of the Scholarly Literature on Sino-American Relations 
       This study also contributes to a longstanding historiographical debate on the “Lost 
Chance” Thesis. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, Cold War diplomatic historians 
like Herbert Feis and Tang Tsou lamented how the United States “lost” China and blamed 
the Roosevelt and Truman administrations for not fully supporting Jiang and the GMD.15 
Then in the early 1970s, historians such as Joseph Esherick, Warren Cohen, Gabriel Kolko, 
and Barbara Tuchman developed the “Lost Chance” Thesis, which argued both 
administrations missed an opportunity to develop amicable relations with the CCP and 
                                                          
14 Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley, 27. 
15 Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 428-30; and Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-50 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 3-30. 
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prevent their alignment with the Soviet Union. These historians focused on the events 
between 1944-1950, including the Hurley Mission.16 They pointed out several overtures 
made by the CCP and its leader, Mao Zedong, to the United States and argued that CCP 
decision-making was influenced more by pragmatism than ideology. This meant the United 
States could have persuaded Mao toward alignment for pragmatic reasons, despite vast 
ideological differences. 
       In the 1980s, historians offered challenges to the “Lost Chance” thesis after China’s 
leader, Deng Xioping, opened China to economic liberalization and educational reform. This 
liberalization brought about the public release of important party documents for the first time. 
These documents exposed the close alignment that had existed between the CCP and Soviet 
Union since 1944 and provided new insight into the CCP’s relationship with the U.S.17 Using 
these documents, historians Steven Goldstein, Chen Jian, and Michael Sheng contended that 
ideology did in fact matter to Mao and the CCP, that the CCP always planned on a Sino-
Soviet alignment, and that overtures made to the U.S. were tactical, not genuine.18 In the long 
term, the CCP would never have aligned with the U.S. This essentially destroyed the “Lost 
Chance” Thesis’s application to the Hurley Mission, as CCP overtures became mere facades 
used to obtain aid and weaken the GMD’s relationship with the U.S. The Hurley Mission was 
                                                          
16 Cohen, America’s Response to China, 156-61, 172; Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: 
The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), 249-
50, 253, 260, 273; Service, Lost Chance in China; and Tuchman, “If Mao Had Come,” 44-48. 
17 Warren I. Cohen, “Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China,” Diplomatic History 21, no. 1 (1997): 
71-75; Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), ix., 5; and Schaller, The United States and China, 198-202. 
18 Steven M. Goldstein, “Chinese Communist Policy Toward the United States: Opportunities and Constraints, 
1944-1950,” in Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950, ed. Dorothy Borg and Waldo 
Heinrichs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 236-37, 242, 247-48; Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the 
Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 22-23, 33; Michael M. Sheng, Battling 
Western Imperialism: Mao Stalin, and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 3-7. 
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also destined to fail since Mao never planned on forming a coalition government and only 
used negotiations to prepare for civil war. 
       All but dead, the “Lost Chance” Thesis found new life in the late-1980s and early-1990s 
when Nancy Tucker and Thomas Christensen modified the argument and its focus.19 
Concentrating on the period between 1948-1950, they claimed that although amicable 
relations between the U.S. and CCP would have been highly unlikely, the level of hostility 
could have been managed and a working relationship established that served each side’s self-
interest in a peaceful, stable Asia. Christensen even goes so far as to argue that U.S. 
diplomatic recognition of the newly established People’s Republic of China in October 1949 
would have kept the lines of communication open between Beijing and Washington and 
reduced the likelihood of a Sino-American confrontation in Korea late 1950.20 John Service, 
the Foreign Service officer who clashed with Hurley, reached a similar conclusion back in 
1971, but cited the Hurley Mission as the turning point. In his book, The Amerasia Papers: 
Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations, he observed, “The opportunities lost 
were to seek more realistic means of averting, or blunting, civil war and of preserving our 
relations with China, if not as the close friend and ally we once hoped for, at least on a basis 
better than bitter enmity.”21  
       This study agrees that 1944-1945 could have constituted a turning point in Sino-
American relations had someone other than Hurley been ambassador at the time. A more 
qualified diplomat, such as Hurley’s predecessor, Ambassador Clarence Gauss, would have 
                                                          
19 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American 
Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 139-40. 
20 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 139-40; and Nancy B. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American 
Relations and the Recognition Controversy 1949-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 58. 
21 John S. Service, The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations (Berkeley: 
Center for Chinese Studies, 1971), 95. 
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likely adopted a more neutral posture in dealing with the CCP and GMD and set the course 
for a pragmatic Sino-American relationship. In stark contrast to Hurley, Gauss had expressed 
disenchantment with the Nationalist government and held both the U.S. embassy staff and 
Foreign Service officers in high regard. Another actor who would have likely effected a 
different outcome was the American commander in China, Joseph Stilwell. Stilwell also 
strongly disliked Jiang Jieshi and had a mutually respectful relationship with the Foreign 
Service officers attached to his staff. Furthermore, he was strongly in favor of arming the 
Communists prior to his recall. On the other hand, his replacement, General Albert 
Wedemeyer, greatly admired Jiang and appeased Hurley every step of the way. 
       Given the upheaval of war with Japan and civil war within China, American policy 
towards China was not clearly defined in 1944. Thus, Hurley was in a unique position to 
create and implement his own policy and make it the official position of the U.S. 
government. President Harry Truman’s decision to send General George Marshall to China 
from December 1945 to January 1947 to make one last attempt to broker a CCP-GMD 
coalition government, presented Washington with its final chance to accommodate the rise of 
the CCP. While Marshall exhibited greater flexibility than Hurley, going so far as to 
temporarily cut off U.S. lend-lease supplies to China to bring Jiang to the negotiating table, 
Marshall, Truman, and Secretary of State James Byrnes had all previously agreed that if the 
Communists refused reasonable concessions, then the U.S. would restore military aid to 
Jiang and support a unitary GMD government.22 Conservative American critics of even 
modest efforts to reach out to the CCP, especially a rising anti-Communist lobby within the 
Republican Party, who would later become known as the infamous “China Lobby,” proved to 
                                                          
22 Cohen, America’s Response to China, 167; and Schaller, The United States and China, 114-15. 
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be more powerful once the war with Japan ended and restricted the Truman administration’s 
room to maneuver.23 When Jiang balked at sharing power, Truman and Marshall saw no 
option other than to tilt back to the GMD. 
       The moment of opportunity in fact arrived during the war years only to be squandered by 
Patrick Hurley. While a deep ideological antipathy toward communism no doubt drove 
Hurley to reject Mao’s CCP and to underestimate Jiang’s shortcomings as a national leader, 
notions of “primitive masculinity” made it difficult for the general to question his anti-
Communist impulses. And when more experienced specialists in the Foreign Service 
counseled compromise with the CCP, Hurley not only questioned their political judgment, he 
dismissed them as upper-class busy bodies against whom he would stand manly and tall.  
Gender and Class and Hurley’s Developing Years 
       The story of how cultural constructions of manhood and class drove a wedge between 
the United States and China’s Communist rebels is traceable to the Oklahoma countryside 
where a young Patrick Hurley grew up. Pat was born in 1883 in Oklahoma’s Indian 
Territory. His father, Pierce, had migrated from Ireland in the 1870s and experienced a string 
of economic failures. Following an unsuccessful attempt to grow cotton, he was forced to 
move into Choctaw territory and become a tenant farmer. When farm tenancy did not work 
out, he opted to take a job working for a coal company.24  
       By age eleven, young Pat was already working in the coal mines with his father as a 
trapper boy to keep food on the table. Hurley’s biographer, Russell Buhite noted, “Frontier 
communities were comprised of a rough lot of men and mining towns contained some of the 
                                                          
23 The “China Lobby” did not form until early 1949, and even then, the loose Conservative alliance held little 
influence. By the early 1950s, they managed to hold enough sway over public opinion to inhibit any potential 
overtures by Truman to the Chinese Communists. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, 80-81. 
24 Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley, 3-4. 
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roughest…”25 Hurley’s childhood friend, Victor Locke, confirmed this analysis by claiming 
“no rougher people were to be found any where than those in the coal camps.” 26 It was 
during this developmental period an impressionable Pat learned about proper ideals of 
masculinity. Various accounts mention the boy’s many brawls with miners and neighborhood 
children.27 In one altercation, he nearly killed a fellow miner after swinging an iron rod 
against his head.28 By the early years of the twentieth century, elite, mainstream advocates of 
the “primitive manhood” ethos, like philosopher William James, argued that rough 
conditions, such as those that characterized the Oklahoma plains, were essential to forming 
proper manhood. In 1910, James in fact called for a “corps of youth” that “would work at 
physical labor, from coal mining [emphasis added] to road building with this ultimate 
purpose: ‘To get the childishness knocked out of them, and to come back into society with 
healthier sympathies and soberer ideas.’”29 
       Stories of Hurley’s masculine rites of passage abound. As a child, he dreamed of 
becoming a prizefighter, which according to Bederman was one of the most celebrated 
institutions for displaying one’s manliness.30 Though he never realized his boxing ring 
                                                          
25 Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley, 6. 
26 Statement by Major Victor Locke, Jr., June 30, 1941, Patrick J. Hurley Manuscript Collection, Western 
History Collections, 1 (hereafter cited as 1941 Locke Statement). 
27 Grant Foreman Biography of Patrick J. Hurley in 1880s, Patrick J. Hurley Manuscript Collection, Western 
History Collections, 4; Grant Foreman Chapters Regarding Early Days of Patrick J. Hurley in Muskogee, 
Patrick J. Hurley Manuscript Collection, Western History Collections, 3 (hereafter cited as Foreman Chapters); 
Grant Foreman Manuscript Regarding Patrick J. Hurley, Patrick J. Hurley Manuscript Collection, Western 
History Collections, 29 (hereafter cited as Foreman Manuscript); and Parker LaMoore, “From Coal Mine to 
Cabinet,” Patrick J. Hurley Manuscript Collection, Western History Collections (hereafter cited as LaMoore, 
“From Coal Mine to Cabinet”). 
28 Foreman Manuscript, 52-53. 
29 Rotundo, American Manhood, 234. 
30 Bederman, Manliness & Civilization, 17; Foreman Manuscript, 29; Patrick Hurley to Alice Mackey, April 6, 
1946, Patrick J. Hurley Manuscript Collection, Western History Collections; and Patrick Hurley to Victor 
Locke Jr., April 21, 1937, Patrick J. Hurley Manuscript Collection, Western History Collections. When one of 
Hurley’s friends named their child after him, he expressed that with such a name the child was destined to 
become a prize-fighter. Later in life, he would often refer back to prizefighting.  
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dreams, he found other outlets for his often violent and vengeful temperament. Around the 
age of twelve, an innocent Pat was beaten by a convenience store-keeper who had mistakenly 
accused him of stealing sugar. Although the store-keeper later apologized, the boy plotted his 
revenge. After the incident, young Pat rode up on a horse and whacked his enemy on the 
head with a homemade weapon. The store-keeper dropped to the ground, nearly dead. 
Defiant and proud, Pat unabashedly told his mother “he had no regrets; that he had tried to 
kill the store-keeper.”31 
       If living in the frontier and working the mines were not enough to teach the rebellious 
child what it meant to be a proper man, certainly growing up with a borderline abusive father 
was. Pierce was, according to an array of friends and acquaintances, an alcoholic with a 
violent temper and a “born rebel who liked to argue, ‘cuss,’ and fight and was not 
discriminating as to his opponent.”32 He has been described by biographers and 
acquaintances as “fiery,” “pugnacious,” and a “ne’er-do-well.”33 Hurley’s sister, Alice, 
described her father as “a moody, brilliant sensitive, irritable, erratic man, with a violent and 
explosive temper…and, above all, a born rebel.”34 He associated with the roughest men in 
the mines and enjoyed “the company of men as rough as he.”35 When Hurley recounted his 
childhood with a friend, he proudly claimed to come from a “fighting family.”36 Pierce 
                                                          
31 After hearing her son’s murderous intent, Hurley’s mother “burst into tears and endeavored to persuade him 
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J. Hurley (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956), 26. 
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“encouraged his sons to be men in their own right and to demand an eye for an eye,” such as 
the time he scolded Pat for merely shooting over a boy’s head instead of killing him.37 Since 
Hurley’s mother passed away when he was thirteen years old, these contentious men served 
as his primary role models. His sister later recalled that he had inherited many of their 
father’s traits.38 
       Unlike his father, Hurley found a way to channel his fighting spirit through formal 
military service. When the Spanish-American War began in 1898, he traveled to Houston to 
enlist in Theodore Roosevelt’s “Rough Rider” unit but was caught attempting to falsify his 
age.39 Hurley received his first military experience with the Indian Territorial Militia and 
Oklahoma National Guard in 1904 and 1914, respectively. The Territorial Militia consisted 
of a group of minute men who carried any available arms. Hurley was eventually appointed 
Captain of a company of about seventy men.40 In 1917, he joined the regular army and 
worked in the Judge Advocate General’s Office as a clerk. Hurley was “crazy to go over seas 
[sic]” and be on the front lines where the action was.41 He wrote his sister, “I want to get to 
the field. Maybe I’ll dislike the trenches but I don’t care if I do. I want to hear the big guns 
rattle and feel the ardor of fray, if it doesn’t happen but once in my life.”42  
       His wish was soon granted as he was transferred to France where he rose to the rank of 
lieutenant colonel and had the time of his life. “I am enjoying this game more than any thing 
[sic] I have ever done,” he wrote home cheerfully. “I know it is as natural for me to be a 
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History Collections, 1-2. 
41 Ibid., 2-3. 
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soldier as it was for ‘buck’ in Jack London’s ‘Call of the Wild’ to be a wolf.”43 Throughout 
the war, Hurley sought to emulate “all the chivalry, all the valor…all the patriotism and all 
the glory of American manhood” that heroes like Francis Marion of Revolutionary War fame 
and contemporary Theodore Roosevelt epitomized.44   
       To the newly decorated colonel, men like Roosevelt demonstrated the “fighting” and 
“manly” qualities that true men should embody.45 It is no coincidence that Roosevelt stood in 
many ways as the personification of “primitive manhood,” as he pushed strongly for men to 
embrace their passion and “included anger, revenge, and ‘a readiness to suffer’ among the 
impulses…approved for manly use.”46 Like Roosevelt, Hurley contended war was necessary 
to cultivate real men. In the midst of World War I, he proclaimed,  
I am praying every day that the war will not be stopped until the Boche are whipped so 
they will stay whipped, and until our own dear country has acquired a soul. She is in a 
fair way to get a soul, but it hasn’t gone far enough yet. She hasn’t had a real soul since 
the days of Lincoln. This war if it lasts long enough will make strong, God loving men 
out of the hundreds of thousands of cigarette smoking, cocktail drinking, tango trolling, 
fish walking, lounge lizards.47 
 
       Throughout life, Hurley continued to define himself and those around him by their 
adherence to martial virtues such as chivalry, loyalty, duty, strength, and courage.48 In a letter 
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to his son, Hurley explained that the most appealing aspect of his character was his courage. 
He claimed, “Courage is the most attractive attribute a man can have.”49 In a speech to the 
Boy Scouts of America in 1929, he contended that the scouts gave boys a taste of army 
discipline, which included “a sense of responsibility and loyalty to duty” and “obedience to 
duly appointed superiors,” both which were key to building a strong moral character.50 This 
devotion to loyalty, duty, and courage, would follow Hurley to his China mission and play a 
considerable role in his perception of the State Department personnel, whom he would 
consider disloyal and cowardly. 
       Hurley would never have made his way to the presidential appointment to China without 
acquiring a modicum of wealth and political experience. Rural Oklahoma afforded Hurley 
only a semblance of an education. Yet prior to the outbreak of the Great War, he managed to 
acquire a B.A. from Indian University in Oklahoma and a law degree from National 
University. While the rigor of his education was limited, it proved sufficient to open a law 
practice in Tulsa, serve as lawyer for the Choctaw Nation, and to represent wealthy oil 
companies based in his home state.51 By 1929, he had accumulated over one million dollars 
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in wealth.52 Impressively, Hurley worked to escape the hardships of working-class life and 
rose to wealth and prominence; yet he identified strongest with his working-class and 
regional origins. 
       During the 1920s, Hurley became active in politics for the Republican Party. In 1928, he 
ran the preconvention campaign for presidential candidate Herbert Hoover in Oklahoma and 
in 1929 accepted appointment as Assistant Secretary of War. Later that year, Secretary of 
War James Good died and Hurley was promoted to Secretary of War.53 It is difficult to 
pinpoint when exactly Hurley met Franklin Roosevelt, although it was likely during his 
tenure as Secretary of War or immediately after when he represented the Sinclair Oil 
Company. Sinclair, along with many other American oil companies, had been caught up in a 
dispute with the post-revolutionary Mexican government intent on nationalizing the 
country’s oil industry. Representing Sinclair, Hurley petitioned for assistance from the U.S. 
State Department and according to his biographer, Don Lohbeck, consulted frequently with 
President Roosevelt.54  
       This personal relationship resulted in Hurley’s assignment on several military and 
diplomatic missions during World War II. In 1942, Hurley was promoted to the rank of 
brigadier general and traveled to the Southwest Pacific to bring supplies to General Douglas 
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MacArthur in the Philippines. Roosevelt then instructed him to report on Russia’s and the 
Middle East’s military strength. In the summer of 1944, Roosevelt started looking for a new 
assignment for Hurley. Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Chief of Staff George Marshall 
suggested the general be sent to China where trouble was brewing. 
The Guomindang, the Communists, and the China Hands 
       The China Patrick Hurley encountered in 1944 was, like turn-of-the-century Oklahoma, 
a rough and tumble place. But that was about as far as resemblances went. China had become 
caught up in a process of political and social tumult that had no American equivalent. 
Beginning with the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, a dynasty widely condemned in 
China for its weakness in the face of European and American imperial demands for trading 
and political concessions, the country reeled from political instability that featured 
republicans, communists, and warlords locked in bitter struggle.55 While the GMD and the 
CCP had briefly formed a “United Front” in the 1920s, Jiang severed the alliance with a 
bloody purge of Communists that began in 1927. A “Second United Front” formed in the 
second half of the 1930s in response to Japan’s aggression, but it too fell short of achieving 
full unity.56 
       By 1944, the “Second United Front” was falling apart. The GMD and CCP were 
essentially working separately and frequently fighting each other. In January 1941, a major 
battle broke out between GMD forces and the CCP’s New Fourth Army, which made 
cooperation tenuous.57 The CCP gained wide support of the peasants in the countryside and 
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consolidated power in northern China and behind Japanese lines, making its headquarters in 
the city of Yan’an.58 Meanwhile, the GMD relocated its government from Nanjing near the 
central coast further inland to the city of Chongqing, which became the government’s 
provisional wartime capital. The government was losing popular support throughout China as 
well and gaining a scathing reputation for being corrupt.59 
       Prior to General Hurley’s arrival in China, the United States had backed the “United 
Front” against Japan by sending lend-lease supplies to the GMD’s Nationalist government. 
Washington also dispatched General Joseph Stilwell to command the China-Burma-India 
Theater. Stilwell and the American ambassador in Chongqing, Clarence Gauss, had 
nonetheless become increasingly irritated with Jiang because of his unwillingness to fight the 
Japanese in Burma or integrate seasoned Communist troops into his army.60 President 
Roosevelt sent Vice President Henry Wallace to China in June 1944 to investigate the 
problems between Jiang, Stilwell, and the Communists. This mission had two important 
outcomes. The first was that Jiang allowed a group of American diplomats, dubbed the 
United States Army Observer Group, to travel to the Communist headquarters in Yan’an. 
Prior to this, only a few journalists had been allowed to travel there.61 The second significant 
outcome was that Roosevelt responded to a request by Jiang to send a personal representative 
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to mediate between he and Stilwell, which led to the initial conception of the Hurley 
Mission.62 
       The United States Army Observer Group, nicknamed, the “Dixie Mission,” was the 
brainchild of Foreign Service Officer John Paton Davies, who was political adviser to 
General Stilwell at the time.63 The Dixie Mission, commanded by Colonel David Barrett, 
flew to Yan’an at the end of July and met with the Communist delegation, which included 
Mao. Foreign Service Officer John Service, who also advised Stilwell, joined the mission to 
study the CCP’s military strength and began writing reports extolling the CCP’s popular 
political base and military capabilities which he circulated to both U.S. officials and press.64  
       It was a new practice to have Foreign Service officers attached to military commands 
like Stilwell’s and act as political advisers, as Service and fellow officer Davies did.65 
Foreign Service officers were typically assigned to embassies and reported to the embassy’s 
ambassador. Prior to his assignment to Stilwell, Service worked under Chongqing 
ambassador, Gauss. Working under Stilwell, however, gave Foreign Service officers like 
Service and Davies the authority to send reports to the State Department, embassy, military, 
and journalists without the approval of the ambassador. This arrangement would cause a 
great deal of friction between the Foreign Service officers and Hurley once he became 
ambassador. Hurley believed the Foreign Service officers were wrong to contradict his policy 
goals and became extremely frustrated by their ability to go over his head, viewing them as 
acts of disloyalty and insubordination. 
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       Class and educational differences between Hurley and the Foreign Service officers also 
generated antagonism. A large percentage of Foreign Service diplomats had earned degrees 
at Ivy League schools, including Harvard, Princeton, and Yale, which gave the Service a 
reputation for being elitist.66 And in contrast to Hurley, Service and Davies had known China 
their entire lives. Service was born in Chengdu, China to American missionary parents, who 
had moved to China in 1906 to set up the first YMCA in the region. The family enjoyed the 
luxury of servants, and his father was well respected among his work associates. Unlike 
Hurley, who had received little education until college, Service had already completed eight 
school grades by age eleven.67 He then attended the Shanghai American School for his first 
three years and spent his senior year at a high school in Berkeley, California, graduated from 
Oberlin College, and passed the Foreign Service exam in 1933. Further advanced study in 
Chinese language, history, and culture helped him to become known in diplomatic circles as 
a “China hand,” that is, an official expert on China. During his years of assignments in 
China, Service developed many contacts among the American press, missions, business and 
diplomatic circles, and influential Chinese.68  
       One of John Service’s closest friends growing up was John Davies, whose parents had 
also served as missionaries in China.69 The family met the Services when they moved to 
Chengdu. Davies’s educational background in private schools in many ways mirrored 
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Service’s, capped by graduation from Columbia University in New York City.70 After 
passing the Foreign Service exam in 1931, Davies spent seven years in China at various 
embassies. Between 1933 and 1935, he went through the same Chinese studies course 
Service had taken.71 
       Thus, while the clashes that ensued between Davies and Service and Hurley arose over 
real differences in policy priorities and arguments over the chain of command, they would 
also be fueled by class and educational antagonisms that pitted well-groomed policy making 
elites against the rough-hewn, salt-of-the-earth Oklahoman. 
Hurley’s Arrives in China and Cleans House 
       Hurley arrived in China on September 6, 1944. He had been directed by Roosevelt “to 
promote harmonious relations between General Chiang and General Stilwell and to facilitate 
the latter’s exercise of command over the Chinese armies placed under his direction.”72 The 
following day, Hurley began working out the details of the command with Stilwell, Jiang, 
and Jiang’s foreign minister, T.V. Soong. These talks proved fruitless. Meanwhile, the 
fighting with the Japanese in Burma intensified making Jiang’s cooperation with U.S. 
commanders all the more urgent. On September 16, Roosevelt sent Jiang a chastising 
message, reprimanding him for not placing Stilwell in charge of his forces. Stilwell 
personally delivered the message out of spite.73  
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       At this interlude, Jiang either wittingly or unwittingly began working to divide the 
American diplomatic and military contingent. It turned out he had a willing accomplice in 
Hurley. On September 25, Jiang told the newly arrived American emissary he would place 
his forces under an American’s command, but only if Stilwell was replaced.74 Hurley sided 
with Jiang and suggested Roosevelt recall Stilwell. This would be the first of many instances 
where Hurley supported Jiang.75 Stilwell was recalled on October 19 and replaced by General 
Albert C. Wedemeyer.  
       While not immediately apparent, Stilwell’s recall undermined Service and Davies, the 
Dixie Mission, and embassy staff who had grown increasingly disenchanted with Jiang and 
willing to bring Communist forces more fully into the U.S.-China fold. In Stilwell, they had a 
close associate willing to stand up to the GMD.76 In fact, less than a month prior to his recall, 
Stilwell planned on traveling to Yan’an to discuss arming the Communists and deploying 
them once he had seized control of the Chinese armies.77 Wedemeyer, in contrast, greatly 
admired Jiang and worked to nurture a close personal relationship with the GMD leader, 
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even winning invitations to stay overnight in the latter’s home.78 Though Wedemeyer at 
times demonstrated respect for his Foreign Service aides, he also promised Hurley that he 
and his staff, including Service and Davies, would refrain from political reporting so long as 
Hurley stayed out of military matters.79 This reduced the role of the Dixie Mission to “the 
status of collecting routine enemy intelligence and weather reporting.”80  
       Another great loss for the Foreign Service officers, perhaps the most significant of all, 
was Ambassador Gauss’s resignation on November 1. Gauss had become incensed by his 
lack of involvement in the discussions between Jiang and Stilwell and quickly complained of 
Hurley’s determination to usurp the embassy’s authority. He was also thoroughly fed up with 
Jiang’s refusal to work with the CCP.81 With the support of Roosevelt and Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull, Gauss and Soong had been discussing the possibility of forming a war council 
which would include the CCP. These talks had been in development since July. When Gauss 
finally met with Jiang on September 15, Jiang quickly dismissed the idea.82 Service recalled 
the episode, stating that “what dominated his long private conversation with me…was the 
long and serious thought that he had devoted to developing his proposal to Chiang, his 
disappointment at the blunt, almost out-of-hand way it had been dismissed…and his deep 
discouragement about these implications for the future of China and American interests 
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involved there.”83 This was the final straw for Gauss, who then abruptly resigned. Roosevelt 
appointed Hurley to be the replacement.84 
       Unfortunately for Service and Davies, this meant the deprivation of another ally. Gauss, 
like Stilwell, shared a close personal relationship with Service, stemming from their work 
together in the Chongqing embassy. Gauss even defended Service during his loyalty 
hearings, saying, “‘He was outstanding. I don’t know of any officer in my whole thirty-nine 
years of service who impressed me more favorably than Jack Service.’”85 Although Gauss 
and Davies’s relationship was strained at times, Davies “respected and was fond of Gauss.”86 
He indicated Gauss had “an analytical, skeptical mind,” and that his “reporting on China, 
supported by an outstandingly able staff, was dispassionate, balanced, and, viewed in 
retrospect, perceptive.”87 Gauss had also become disenchanted by Jiang and opposed to deep 
involvement in China’s internal politics.88 
       Hurley had little patience for skeptical minds in his midst. As ambassador, he demanded 
loyalty and subservience. On assignment in Iran two years prior, he had complained arrogant 
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State Department officials had worked to undermine his effort to provide economic aid to the 
monarchical state and cultivate it as a model for U.S. backed democracy in the Middle East. 
Hurley found a State Department memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson and Eugene Rostow which referred to his proposals as “hysterical messianic 
globaloney.” According to Acheson, Hurley confronted him in his office where he became 
“violently angry.”89 Hurley had just experienced his first taste of the “stuffed-shirt diplomats 
in the State Department.”90  
       In China, Hurley found himself in a unique position to create and implement his own 
interpretation of American foreign policy due to the lack of an explicit directive from 
Roosevelt or the State Department regarding GMD and CCP negotiations.91 Arthur Ringwalt, 
the embassy’s political section chief, recalled Hurley had told him that “he had arrived 
without any instructions whatever from Washington, and he said, ‘If I haven’t been given 
American policy, I shall make American policy.’”92 The State Department reacted slowly to 
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Hurley’s policy creation and implementation, largely because Hurley kept them in the dark 
during negotiations.93 The Office of Far Eastern Affairs and Division of Chinese Affairs in 
the State Department would advocate a more flexible and neutral policy approach once 
negotiations had commenced, but to no avail.94 
       Several incidents early in the mission suggested Hurley’s relations with his embassy 
staff would be strained. His initial impression was that the embassy seemed “disorganized, 
dirty, inefficient, and sulky.”95 According to several sources, he spent little time there and 
instead required his staff come to his house, never developing any sort of personal 
relationship with them.96 When he did decide to move into the official residence, he only 
gave his staff a few hours’ notice to move out.97 According to Hurley, George Atcheson 
explained that no unoccupied beds remained in the house, but if Hurley arranged for a bed, 
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the staff would welcome him. Hurley believed Atcheson had “deliberately affronted him” 
and later demanded the house be handed over to him, explaining that “while I liked all the 
men I had reached that age where when I was at home I would like to be my own master and 
not have to entertain a multitude of people who lived with me. In addition to that I thought it 
would probably be better if I chose those whom I desired to live with me.”98 Atcheson 
responded by claiming that living conditions in Chongqing were such that the ambassador 
could not expect a house and that “they had a right to live in it.”99 Hurley then secured a 
house for them and moved the staff out completely within nine weeks.100 
Hurley: He-Man Diplomacy 
       With Stilwell and Gauss out of the picture, the Dixie Mission and Foreign Service 
officers on a tight leash, and the State Department’s China policy non-existent, Hurley 
relished the opportunity to formulate policy. The substance of the negotiations between 
Hurley, Jiang, and Mao has been covered elsewhere and lies outside the scope of this project, 
however, Buhite has provided as succinct a summary as anyone. 
Discussions with Communist leaders in Chungking proved that they were unwilling to 
commit their army to Chiang’s command without satisfactory guarantees…they wanted 
abolition of one-party rule and the formation of a coalition government, which the 
Generalissimo felt he could not permit…what the Communists desired was a full and 
meaningful participation in the government and freedom to continue as a party seeking 
support in all parts of China. Chiang could not agree, because he could only lose…the 
Communists wanted full recognition of the governments they had established, and 
supplies for their army. From the Generalissimo’s point of view, to grant such 
concessions was equally dangerous. His position was, therefore, that the Communists 
“surrender” their army by submitting it to Nationalist control; and this was equivalent to 
asking them to concede.101 
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Given these realities, Hurley had little chance of negotiating a coalition government. In fact, 
both the CCP and GMD used the negotiations to prepare for war.  
       For the duration of negotiations, Hurley mediated based on several assumptions. His first 
assumption was that part of his mission included supporting and sustaining Jiang.102 He also 
incorrectly assumed the CCP were not real Communists. Hurley had stopped in Moscow 
prior to going to China to verify that the Soviet Union would not aid the CCP. He met with 
Stalin’s foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, who assured him the Soviet Union would not 
support the Chinese Communists, who “had no relation whatever to Communism.” Hurley 
took the foreign minister at his word and resolutely believed the Soviet Union would never 
aid the CCP.103 Furthermore, Hurley severely underestimated the CCP’s strength for winning 
a civil war. Because of these assumptions, Hurley erroneously concluded he held leverage 
over the CCP.104  
       The new ambassador also failed to comprehend the ideological gap between the GMD 
and CCP, believing they held similar objectives. Davies stated Hurley was “convinced that 
there were no fundamental ideological conflicts between the Reds and Chiang’s regime—for 
both were, in his opinion, devoted to government by, for, and of the people…”105 He 
regarded the CCP as nothing other than a group of agrarian reformers fighting for 
democracy, pursuing the same goal as the GMD.106 The deep cultural, political, and historical 
divide between the two factions eluded him, as did the CCP’s strong commitment to 
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Communist ideological principles.107 In addition to the cultural forces of gender and class, 
these assumptions guided Hurley’s ideology and decision-making throughout the mission. 
       What other scholars have not observed about the Hurley Mission, however, is the way in 
which the ambassador’s hard-charging, take-no-prisoner approach to diplomacy belied a 
deeply embedded sense of masculinity. In Chongqing, he not only established himself as the 
patriarch of the household, but also treated those of a lesser rank much as his own abusive 
father had treated him. Naysayers were called out, disparaged, and dismissed, as Hurley’s 
relationship with John Davies would illustrate. The tension quickly became evident when the 
ambassador arrived in Yan’an to meet with the CCP delegation in November 1944. Davies, 
along with Dixie Mission Commander David Barrett, warned Hurley about the difficult 
demands the CCP would make and the unlikelihood of reaching an agreement. Davies 
noticed that “General Hurley appeared to be rather taken aback by these comments.” The 
ambassador promptly told Davies “that he wished to conduct the negotiations with the 
Communists himself and it would be best were I to return promptly to Chungking.”108 Hurley 
had asserted his authority. 
       The Hurley-Davies problem did not end there.109 Relations became particularly hostile 
after Davies visited Yan’an on December 15 with Barrett and Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) agent, Willis Bird. Wedemeyer’s chief of staff, Robert McClure, had ordered Barrett 
“to get the Communists’ reaction to a new contingency plan to drop thousands of American 
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paratroopers into north China.”110 Willis Bird, the new OSS deputy chief in China, explained 
the plan to the Communists, and promised “to provide training in the use of modern 
weapons, demolition explosives…plus equipment to outfit 25,000 Communist guerrillas.”111 
The prospect of obtaining American aid without negotiating with the GMD emboldened the 
CCP to reject Hurley and Jiang’s on-going proposals for CCP absorption into Jiang’s army. 
When Hurley found out, he accused Barret, Bird, Davies, and McClure of intentionally 
sabotaging him. Barrett wrote, “He took the stand we had tried to work behind his back 
against the interest of the National Government.”112 Hurley then had Barrett’s promotion to 
brigadier general cancelled. Barrett would never again have an opportunity for the 
promotion.113 Wedemeyer, offended by Hurley’s accusations, maintained there was no 
reason to distrust the loyalty of his chief of staff and Foreign Service advisers.114 While it 
was true the secret OSS mission potentially undermined negotiations, it was indeed a far cry 
from sabotage. Moreover, the OSS and Dixie Mission’s Foreign Service officers worked 
outside the embassy and were not Hurley’s subordinates.115 Davies became guilty by 
association, even though his reasons for visiting Yan’an were entirely independent from Bird 
and Barrett’s. 
       By the year’s end, Hurley had become extremely frustrated with the deadlock of 
negotiations and looked outward for blame. Davies claimed that Soong frequently 
manipulated Hurley and attempted to breed distrust. On December 23, Davies wrote his wife, 
“Yesterday I had quite a blowup with the ambassador [Hurley]. He accused me of sneaking 
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off to Yenan on this last trip to wreck his negotiations. T.V. Soong had told him so. And 
apparently he accepted T.V.’s explanation. Who [Soong] had said that I had advised the 
Communists not to pay any attention to Hurley because he was an old fool. Very nice.”116 
Davies tried to convince Hurley of Soong’s deception, but the ambassador responded in 
typical tough guy parlance that “he had a good mind to break my back.”117 After the Yan’an 
trip, Hurley suggested Davies get himself transferred. Davies had in fact already sought 
transfer, but Hurley accelerated the process.118 
       The crescendo of Hurley’s rage occurred as Davies was leaving for his new post at 
Moscow’s embassy on January 9, 1945. Davies visited Wedemeyer and Hurley to say 
goodbye. After wishing the ambassador luck on the negotiations, he offered one final piece 
of advice. Davies “incautiously expressed the hope that he would not be caught in the tangles 
of Chinese intrigue should the negotiations fail.”119 According to Davies, Hurley “became 
quite florid and puffy, shouting that he would break my back and other pleasantries. ‘You 
want to pull the plug on Chiang Kai-shek,’ he repeatedly bellowed.”120 Wedemeyer also 
presented a vivid account, 
The Ambassador and Mr. Davies then launched into a very heated argument during 
which Hurley accused Davies of being a Communist and of failing to support the 
directive of his country in support of the Chinese Nationalists. Tears came to the eyes of 
Mr. Davies as he heatedly denied Hurley’s accusations. Hurley said that he was going to 
have him kicked out of the State Department. Davies begged the Ambassador not to ruin 
his reputation and his career. I endeavored to calm them down…121 
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Although Hurley left no record of his impression of the confrontation, it is reasonable to 
conclude he would have deemed Davies’s crying and begging as shamefully effeminate, as 
these traits stood antithetical to the primitive masculinity ethos. The act of crying is often a 
ritual used to garner sympathy, which Hurley could only interpret as weakness. This would 
only provide further justification for replacing his weak and emotional staff.122 
       Hurley’s aggressive and vengeful nature are made quite clear by the examples of Barrett 
and Davies. Quite in line with “primitive manhood,” Hurley willfully went out of his way to 
punish and enact vengeance.123 Reflecting on their different upbringings and stations of class, 
Wedemeyer even observed that “his temperament was the reverse of my father’s calm and 
reflective way of viewing the world. I was deeply grieved by Pat’s hostility. I had already 
begun to understand his mercurial temperament.”124 Wedemeyer also acknowledged the 
accuracy of an account given by gossip journalist, Drew Pearson, about a conflict that 
erupted between Hurley and McClure.  
At about the same time General McClure, Wedemeyer’s Chief of Staff, encountered 
Hurley at a cocktail party and chided him for sending his telegram of protest without 
prior consultation. “You pup,” roared the former cowpuncher from Oklahoma, “I’ve hit 
men for less than that.” Fists went up…but before anything happened, friends 
intervened.125  
 
Always quick to blow his fuse and ready to respond to dissent with verbal and physical 
aggression, Hurley badly damaged his reputation within the embassy by these kinds of 
altercations and the stories spread throughout the close-knit group of Foreign Service 
officers.  
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       The first time John Service contacted Hurley was following Gauss’s resignation. During 
this phone conversation, Service formed his initial impression of the ambassador, which was 
that he was, 
A blowhard. A man that you can’t talk to, that can’t, wouldn’t listen, and won’t talk to a 
man who’s been on the spot and knows something, [loudly, paraphrasing Hurley] “All 
you people seem to think I’m an ignoramus, that I’ve never had any experience…I’ve 
done a lot of negotiating. I’ve brought parties together. I did this in Mexico…I’m not a 
child,” he said, shouting loudly.126  
 
Though hardly a transcript of the conversation, the account does shed light on the conflict 
brewing between Hurley and the Foreign Service officers. It suggests the new ambassador 
felt uncomfortable in this unfamiliar environment. Since arriving in China, Hurley had felt 
animosity toward the elitist State Department culture. Atcheson recalled that “General Hurley 
began his assignment in Chungking with a strong prejudice against the Dept. and the Foreign 
Service and especially officers who had served with his predecessor…I urged him to show 
confidence in them…It was however, a fixed idea with him that there were officers in the 
Foreign Service and American military officers who were in opposition to him.”127 Another 
Foreign Service officer working at the embassy, Phillip Sprouse, described a similar 
reception by Hurley during their first meeting, where he was “subjected to a forty-five-
minute diatribe against, among others, Ambassador Gauss, John Carter Vincent, John Davies, 
and John Service—all of whom Sprouse held in high personal and professional esteem. ‘I’ve 
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never gone through such an ordeal in my life,’ Sprouse later commented. ‘Hurley didn’t 
know anything about me except that I was a China specialist, and that per se made me 
bad.”128 The ambassador presumably felt threatened by the disparity in experience and 
education compared to his staff’s, especially regarding China.  
       Hurley’s conversation with Service also reveals that the Foreign Service officers bore 
some prejudices of their own. Service clearly did not think highly of him initially. Buhite 
notes that the Foreign Service officers viewed Hurley as intellectually shallow and “as a man 
‘of little capacity,’ a ‘loud talker,’ a ‘stuffed shirt,’ a ‘Colonel Blimp,’ and as at least ‘50 
percent bull.’”129 They may have very well contributed to his estrangement by neither 
considering nor respecting his previous business, legal, and political experience.  
       Unfortunately for Hurley, his aggressive and defensive nature perpetuated and 
intensified the embassy staff’s perception of him as an “ignoramus” and “blowhard.” After 
the Davies incident, Service told the chief of Foreign Service personnel that Hurley’s 
“attitude toward the Foreign Service, and particularly the circumstances that forced John 
Davies’ recall” constituted a real problem.130 The chief agreed, saying “he understood and 
knew about it…and that the State Department understood the situation and would be in effect 
behind me.”131 
       After Stilwell’s recall, Service had been sent to Washington to debrief the State 
Department on his mission to Yan’an. Before New Year’s, Service received a phone call 
from the Division of Chinese Affairs chief, John Carter Vincent, who informed him, “Davies 
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has gotten in a row with Hurley. We’ve got to get him out. Will you go back?”132 Barrett, 
bitter from his encounters with Hurley, warned Service, “You’re committing suicide. Don’t 
go. Hurley will have your scalp.”133  
       When Service arrived at the Chongqing embassy on January 18, 1945 the atmosphere 
had changed. He met with Hurley, who warned that “if I interfered with him, he would break 
me.”134 When asked during an interview about the embassy’s environment, Service replied, 
“Oh, certainly it was a very threatening atmosphere. The whole atmosphere in Chungking 
was threatening. The embassy staff was operating under very difficult conditions. Hurley had 
his own little separate embassy really in a sense. He was communicating not with the State 
Department but with the White House…Also, he was threatening the staff and preventing 
their reporting anything that was unfavorable.”135 Ringwalt insisted Hurley “did his best to 
punish us, being as impossible as he could be to us hoping we would quit.”136 In February, 
Service wrote Davies, “Things are worse than when you were here. Much worse. And 
everybody thinks we Americans are crazy. And George the A (George Atcheson) is in tears, 
most of the time.”137 
       One memorandum from Atcheson to Hurley clearly demonstrates the ambassador’s 
hostility. On January 31, Atcheson sent Hurley notes regarding a message he had drafted for 
the Secretary of State. Questioning some of Hurley’s content, he wrote,  
We would question the statement in the next to last paragraph of the telegram that there 
is opposition among our own diplomatic representatives. There is no one on the staff 
who believes we should by-pass the National Government in dealing with the 
Communists…The preamble is very damning to the staff. If I were in the Department I 
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would imply from your comments that you feel that the staff is of little, if any, use and 
should be replaced.138 
 
       Ringwalt also recalled numerous instances where Hurley created a hostile work 
environment. On one such occasion, he sent Hurley a report about the GMD using lend-lease 
supplies against the CCP. Hurley summoned both Ringwalt and Soong to his office. After 
Soong alleged the report was false, Hurley reprimanded Ringwalt.139 Another time, after the 
ambassador read a report critical of the GMD, he yelled at Ringwalt and threatened to mete 
out some manly frontier justice, “‘You mean to say you sent them that?’” He drew his pistol 
and continued, “‘Why, I’ve killed a man for less than that.’”140 Embittered by Hurley, 
Ringwalt and Fulton Freeman, another China hand who had taken part in the February 28 
memorandum, fled China and returned to Washington in August.141 
       The influence of gender in these many confrontations is apparent. Time and again, 
Hurley demonstrated his strength through aggressive and threatening behaviors, as opposed 
to the Foreign Service officers, who valued traditional Victorian values of self-restraint as an 
expression of inner-strength and proper masculinity.142 Despite Hurley’s constant abuse, 
these men controlled their impulses. Even as he endured Hurley’s lambasting in the Yan’an 
confrontation, Davies clearly sought to stay on the defensive and avoid conflict. Instead of 
challenging the ambassador with assertiveness, the diplomats opposed him with integrity, by 
protesting peacefully and respectably. Ideals and personalities clashed as frequently as 
opinions did. 
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       If Hurley resented the elitism of the Foreign Service and State Department, then why did 
he identify so closely with Jiang and Soong? It was a paradox he never noticed. On the one 
hand, the proud Oklahoman reveled in his working-class heritage and was a proud anti-
intellectual, but on the other, he gravitated toward wealthy and prominent people, as can be 
seen by his relationships with Hoover, Roosevelt, and now Jiang and Soong.143 Davies 
observed, “Hurley had an appetite for hobnobbing with the high and mighty…”144 
Conversely, Mao and the CCP were neither as wealthy nor prominent as Jiang. According to 
Barrett, when Hurley arrived in Yan’an, he was “wearing one of the most beautifully tailored 
uniforms I have ever seen…with enough ribbons on his chest to represent every war…except 
possibly Shay’s Rebellion.”145 Hurley clearly sought to display his eminence and authority. 
The CCP delegation, by contrast, wore very plain uniforms, rode in a “beat-up” truck, and 
lived in “Spartan simplicity.”146 These class differences may in part explain why Hurley 
aligned with Jiang and the Guomindang so early in the mission.  
       Hurley’s alignment with Jiang may also have been the result of the personal relationship 
they developed. Buhite mentions that Hurley and Jiang became close prior to the 
negotiations. “He liked the Generalissimo, trusted him, and Chiang reciprocated the 
feeling…They dined together frequently and spent long hours in discussion during the first 
month of the Hurley mission.”147 Hurley may have also overestimated his ability to persuade 
Jiang to coordinate his own policies with those of the United States. Reflecting on their 
relationship, he wrote, “After many hours’ and weeks’ conversation with him, during which 
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time I spent considerable time at the Generalissimo’s home in Wangchang…we came to 
understand each other. I am convinced that I won the complete confidence of the 
Generalissimo.”148  
       Hurley would also develop close ties with Soong as well as Jiang’s wife, Soong Mei-ling 
(Madame Chiang Kai-shek). Even after his resignation, he continued affectionate 
correspondence with them.149 For example, in one letter to Mei-ling, he fondly reminisced, 
“The fateful days and nights that I spent near to the Generalissimo gave me an opportunity to 
understand him. The charge that as a foreign Ambassador, I was too clearly a supporter of the 
Generalissimo does not disturb me.”150 
       The hostile conditions in the Chongqing embassy climaxed in the defiant telegram of 
February 28, 1945, sent while Wedemeyer and Hurley were visiting Washington for 
consultation.151 For these professional men of refinement, the maneuver seemed audacious 
and certain to alter the status quo. To Service’s surprise, it was Atcheson who suggested the 
ploy.152 “Atcheson was a very traditional diplomat,” Service later remembered, “One didn’t 
expect him to suggest anything as bold and daring as this.”153 Service penned the first draft of 
“The Situation in China,” which recommended weaker commitment to the GMD and 
stronger commitment to the CCP. He based the missive on a report by Foreign Service 
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Officer Raymond Ludden, who had recently returned from the war front in Northern China. 
Ringwalt, Freeman, and Atcheson all joined in reviewing the draft and shaping its 
composition. To give the message more impact and demonstrate their solidarity, they jointly 
signed the message.154 
       Although the message was received by the State Department and forwarded to Roosevelt 
along with a similar memorandum from the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, nothing changed. 
Joseph Ballantine, the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, requested that Acting 
Secretary Joseph Grew discuss both memorandums with Hurley. Grew then forwarded the 
embassy’s memorandum to Roosevelt and stressed the importance of maintaining a flexible 
policy in China.155 After learning of these policy recommendations, Hurley bickered with the 
Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Ballantine tried unsuccessfully to convince the ambassador to 
adopt an alternative foreign policy approach. Hurley, however, deemed the matter closed and 
viewed his staff as a problem to deal with rather than a group of experts, stating that while 
“army opposition to his policy had been eliminated by getting the die-hards transferred…it 
seemed to him that he still had to contend with the State Department career officers who 
were upholding each other…”156 Furious, Hurley brought the dispute to Roosevelt, whose 
exact position remains unknown since no one else was present during their meeting. 
Nevertheless, the outcome became clear as Hurley continued as ambassador. Roosevelt had 
failed to heed the advice of the State Department and Chongqing embassy.157  
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Opposition Silenced, Hurley’s Policy Wins 
       Hurley soon had his revenge on Service, who was suddenly recalled to Washington in 
April. Service later learned that Hurley had convinced Secretary of War Stimson to relieve 
him of duty in China.158 Hurley also dismissed Atcheson for his role in sending the 
underhanded memorandum.159 No more brazen attempts were made once the February 28 
telegram failed to generate a response. Stilwell and Gauss were gone. The Dixie Mission no 
longer made political reports. Davies, Service, and Atcheson had all been transferred, while 
Ringwalt and Freeman jumped ship as soon as possible. Vincent and his colleagues in the 
Office of Far Eastern Affairs had also given up. In a memorandum to Grew, Deputy Director 
of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs Edwin Stanton lamented that Hurley’s 
…antipathy has been confirmed by officers returning from Chungking, who have 
indicated the serious effect it has had upon their own morale and the morale of the other 
Foreign Service officers stationed at Chungking…In consequence, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to persuade Foreign Service officers who have served under 
General Hurley to return to China…We have definite reason to believe that General 
Hurley has ordered that only political reports favorable to the Chinese National 
Government may be made to the Department…and it is apparent that we can no longer 
count on receiving factual and objective reports…”160 
 
       Hurley replaced the China hands with a Virginian banker named Walter Robertson and a 
Latin American specialist, neither of whom had any China background.161 He had finally 
achieved the full compliance and authority he had desired from the beginning. Davies 
bemoaned, “The voice of the Chungking Embassy was stifled and the murmured warnings of 
the senior China experts in the Department went unheeded. With the death of Roosevelt, only 
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Hurley could define what the late President’s mandate to him had been—and Truman raised 
no question on the matter.”162 Hurley proudly admitted he had “cleaned house in the 
Embassy” and had “received new men who would not override U.S. policy at their own 
sovereign pleasure.”163 
       Hurley’s negotiations officially continued intermittently for another five months, 
between his return to Chongqing in April and his second visit to Washington in September. 
While he was in the U.S. the second time, skirmishes broke out between the CCP and GMD. 
With reports of over fifteen thousand deaths, even the obstinate ambassador could hardly 
ignore the disastrous effect this had on current negotiations.164 Frustrated by his entire China 
experience, he was finally ready to call it quits. 
       Hurley abruptly resigned on November 26. In his resignation letter to President Truman, 
he blamed the Foreign Service officers for the mission’s failure, explaining,  
The professional foreign service men sided with the Chinese Communist armed party 
and the imperialist bloc of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against 
herself. Our professional diplomats continuously advised the Communists that my 
efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the 
policy of the United States. These same professionals openly advised the Communist 
armed party to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the National 
Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control.165 
 
       Hurley sought vengeance against Service and Davies by testifying in loyalty hearings 
before a Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December. During these hearings, he also 
attempted to smear the reputations of Atcheson, Ringwalt, Freeman, and Vincent by outing 
them as disloyal saboteurs. He claimed they were all part of a hidden Communist conspiracy 
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within the State Department.166 Service and Davies referred to Hurley’s testimony as “the 
Hurley-burley” where Hurley huffed and puffed, charging they had “sabotaged American 
foreign policy in China, sided with the Chinese Communists, sought to bring about the 
downfall of Chiang Kai-shek’s government, and improperly communicated Government 
information to Chinese Communist Party officials.”167 As committed as the child who had 
bludgeoned the store-keeper all those years ago, Hurley demanded retribution from those 
who had wronged him. 
       The committee eventually ruled that Hurley’s accusations were unfounded. However, 
Service and Davies would continue to face charges of disloyalty because of their China 
service. Service endured loyalty hearings nearly every year between 1945 and 1951 and was 
cleared each time until the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board ruled in December 1951 that 
there was “reasonable doubt” as to Service’s loyalty. Because of the ruling, Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson fired Service, who was not reinstated until 1957.168 Davies also faced nine 
investigations and although he was cleared of all charges by the Loyalty Board, Secretary of 
States John Foster Dulles fired him nonetheless in 1954.169 During one hearing in 1950, 
Service opined, “It is interesting to note that a major portion of the charges which have been 
leveled against me stem directly or indirectly from these original charges made by General 
Hurley.”170 The reputation of these men was ruined during the prime of their careers largely 
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due to Hurley. Hurley also continued to present speeches denouncing these diplomats in the 
years that followed. An assessment of one such speech by an unknown author suggested, 
“The speech is unnecessarily defensive…No useful purpose is to be served by the rehashing 
of your private case against the career men, however righteous your case may be. That’s a 
dead duck.”171 
       The diplomatic mission immediately succeeding Hurley’s was the Marshall Mission. 
Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall became the Chongqing ambassador following 
Hurley’s resignation. Although Hurley was finally out of power, there remained little hope 
for a change in foreign policy. The embassy had almost entirely changed personnel. 
Furthermore, both President Truman and Secretary of State James Byrnes fully supported 
Hurley’s policy. Earlier in September, Truman had reassured Jiang “that there has been no 
change, nor is any change contemplated, in this government’s policy toward China.”172 On 
December 7, Byrnes made what was arguably the first public statement on American policy 
in China since the beginning of the war. “The phase of that policy upon which Ambassador 
Hurley has placed the greatest emphasis is our support of the national government of 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,” he began. Then, cementing what would become official 
policy for nearly three decades, he announced, “We formally recognize only the national 
Government.”173 Furthermore, the U.S. would only support unification under the Nationalist 
Government. All recommendations for a true coalition government had been abandoned.174  
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       Hurley reveled that Byrnes had publicly supported his policy and insisted the statement 
had been “based almost completely on my reports and recommendations to the State 
Department, and are opposed to the position taken throughout the period by the career men of 
the State Department.”175 He alone had triumphantly “recommended all the changes 
necessary to reverse America’s existing policy in China.”176 Hurley also stressed that Byrnes 
had misspoken when he stated that Hurley’s policy had been American policy all along. 
Rather, when he had arrived in China, Gauss and the “career men” had been pursuing an 
alternate policy, which was then rectified by Byrnes’s statement and Hurley’s own expulsion 
of China hands.177 He boasted, “With the full support of the President of the United States we 
made a 180 degree change in the direction of American policy in China after August 1944.” 
Regarding Marshall’s mission, he declared, “There will not be any opportunity for the career 
men to say that the policy that he is following is not the policy of his government.”178 
       Vincent, the new director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, drafted a new foreign 
policy statement for Truman and Marshall. It was surprisingly mild and in some respects 
contrary to the statements from earlier that year. Vincent no longer advocated a flexible 
approach. Instead, the memorandum called for the CCP to integrate their military forces into 
the GMD’s and clearly recognized the GMD as the only legitimate government.179 It was 
clear by then which policy the President and Secretary of State would support. Moreover, 
Vincent needed to tread lightly to avoid investigation, since Hurley had publicly labeled him 
a Communist.  
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       This policy statement was edited by Marshall and Byrnes to support Jiang more 
definitively. The new policy stated that the GMD was “the only legal government in China” 
and declared that the U.S. would continue to provide the GMD with military supplies, with 
no mention of aiding any other factions.180 During a meeting between Marshall, Truman, and 
Byrnes prior to Marshall’s departure to China, they agreed that if negotiations broke down, 
the U.S. would support Jiang.181 All advocates of a real alternative policy were either gone or 
silenced. Hurley’s policy had won. 
       Doubtless, Hurley benefitted from his primitive masculine identity throughout life. 
Those values were necessary for growing up in the tumultuous Southwest of Indian Territory. 
They aided him during rough times in the mines, as well as his rise through the military ranks 
and business world. These martial virtues, however, ill-prepared him for the nuances of 
diplomacy, which required a reciprocal, collaborative, and professional approach. Not only 
did the forces of primitive manhood leave Hurley unequipped to conduct negotiations 
effectively, they also crippled his relationship with the China hands, who could have steered 
him clear of the disastrous policy he was to implement. His consistent inability to 
compromise, fixation on securing complete dominance of authority, and instinctive tendency 
to respond to dissent with violence and retribution originated from lessons about proper 
gender roles he had learned from some of the roughest men frontier life offered. For an 
impressionable child conditioned in a merciless land of outlaws and ruffians, success could 
only be guaranteed through assured self-reliance and relentless tenacity.  
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       This world which taught Hurley how to become a man vastly differed from the world the 
Foreign Service officers knew, where traditional Victorian values of self-restraint and 
integrity dominated both their educational and professional careers. To Hurley, these men 
could hardly be called men at all. They cowardly mocked him behind his back. They avoided 
direct confrontation. They even cried. In essence, these weak men lacked the proper courage 
and discipline that characterized true masculinity. Differences in class drove the wedge even 
further between the unruly general and refined diplomats, creating what became an 
unbridgeable gap. In Hurley’s mind, “China expert” became indistinguishable from the 
snobbish elitism which permeated the State Department. These men had not fought tooth and 
nail to put food on the table or receive a proper education like Hurley had. So of course, his 
silver spoon colleagues failed to comprehend and appreciate his professional experience and 
accomplishments.  
       This schism between Hurley and his staff resulted in the official adoption of the 
ambassador’s haphazard policy, as the China hands were replaced with submissive outsiders. 
In the ring of diplomacy, Hurley had pulled no punches. As the personification of proper 
masculinity, only he could be the last man standing. But victory rang hollow as he struck the 
final blow. To his utter dismay, the crowd did not cheer.  
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